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Announcements
Topic of This Issue: Investing for Retirement |
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Table of ContentsWhat Effect Do Time Constraints Have on the Age of Retirement? Leora Friedberg, University of Virginia - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Paying to Save: Tax Withholding and Asset Allocation among Low- and Moderate-Income Taxpayers Michael S. Barr, University of Michigan Law School Loyalty-Based Portfolio Choice Lauren Cohen, Harvard Business School, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Jonathan Barry Forman, University of Oklahoma College of Law Life Cycle Finance and the Design of Pension Plans Zvi Bodie, Boston University - Department of Finance & Economics David P. Blake, City University London - Cass Business School - The Pensions Institute Peter A. Diamond, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) |
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EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, COMPENSATION & PENSION LAW ABSTRACTS"What Effect Do Time Constraints Have on the Age of Retirement?" CRR Working Paper No. 2008-17
LEORA FRIEDBERG, University of Virginia - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Work affects both the time available for non-market activities and the
times at which those activities are performed - and therefore
work-induced constraints on time use may influence retirement
decisions. We analyze these effects by combining new data from the
American Time Use Survey with information on retirement in the Health
and Retirement Study. "Paying to Save: Tax Withholding and Asset Allocation among Low- and Moderate-Income Taxpayers" FEDS Working Paper No. 2008-11
MICHAEL S. BARR, University of Michigan Law School We analyze the phenomenon that low- and moderate-income (LMI) tax filers exhibit a "preference for over-withholding" their taxes, a measure we derive from a unique set of questions administered in a dataset of 1,003 households, which we collected through the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. We argue that the relationship between their withholding preference and portfolio allocation across liquid and illiquid assets is consistent with models with present-biased preferences, and that individuals exhibit self-control problems when making their consumption and saving decisions. Our results support a model in which individuals use commitment devices to constrain their consumption. Using data on other tax-filing behaviors, we also show that mental accounting and loss aversion explanations for tax filers' "preference for over-withholding" are unlikely to explain the patterns in the data. Present-biasedness and dynamic inconsistency among LMI tax filers have important implications for saving policies and tax administration. "Loyalty-Based Portfolio Choice" The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 1213-1245, 2009
LAUREN COHEN, Harvard Business School, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) I evaluate the effect of loyalty on individuals' portfolio choice using a unique dataset of retirement contributions. I exploit the statutory difference that, in 401(k) plans, stand-alone employees can invest directly in their division, while conglomerate employees must invest in the entire firm, including all unrelated divisions. Consistent with loyalty, employees of stand-alone firms invest 10 percentage points (75%) more in company stock than conglomerate employees. Support is also found using variation in loyalty between different groups of employees, across and within firms. The cost to employees of loyalty is large, amounting to nearly a 20% loss in retirement income. "Funding Public Pension Plans" John Marshall Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 4, 2009
JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, University of Oklahoma College of Law Most state and local government employees are covered by
traditional final-average-pay pension plans. State and local government
employers typically fund those pension plans through a combination of
employer and employee contributions, with help from investment returns
on already-accumulated assets. Unlike private sector pension plans,
however, public pension plans are not subject to strict minimum funding
standards like those in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA). Public pensions also face more relaxed accounting
standards than private sector pensions. To be sure, many public
pensions are nevertheless fairly well funded. Unfortunately, however,
the recent meltdown of financial markets, the decline in the stock
market, and the recession are putting inordinate pressure on both
public pensions and the state and local governments that fund them; and
public employers will need to respond. "Life Cycle Finance and the Design of Pension Plans" Boston U. School of Management Research Paper Series
ZVI BODIE, Boston University - Department of Finance & Economics This article reviews recent scientific literature on consumer financial decisions over the life cycle outlining its implications for the design of pension plans. It begins with a review of advances in the theory of rational financial planning and wealth management. It then summarizes the recent empirical literature on the actual behavior of households regarding saving, investing, and insuring their consumption in old age. Finally, it briefly comments on the practical implications of the theory for the design of pension systems and outlines areas of future research.
DAVID P. BLAKE, City University London - Cass Business School - The Pensions Institute Many, if not most, individuals cannot be regarded as 'intelligent consumers' when it comes to understanding and assessing different investment strategies for their defined contribution pension plans. This gives very little incentive to plan providers to improve the design of their pension plans. As a consequence, pension plans and their investment strategies are still currently in a very primitive stage of their development. In particular, there is very little integration between the accumulation and decumulation stages. It is possible to produce well-designed DC plans but these need to be designed from back to front (that is, from desired outputs to required inputs) with the goal of delivering an adequate targeted pension with a high degree of probability. We use the analogy of designing a commercial aircraft to explain how this might be done. We also investigate the possible role of regulators in acting as surrogate 'intelligent consumers' on behalf of plan members. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2636
PETER A. DIAMOND, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Pension benefit rules depend on individual history far more than taxes do, and age plays a much larger role in pension determination than in tax determination. Apart from some simulation studies, theoretical studies of optimal tax design typically contain neither a mandatory pension system nor the behavioral dimensions that lie behind justifications commonly offered for mandatory pensions. Conversely, optimizing models of pension design typically do not include annual taxation of labor and capital incomes. After spelling out this contrast and reviewing (and rejecting) zero taxation of capital income based on the Atkinson-Stiglitz and Chamley-Judd results, this article raises the issue of tax-favored retirement savings, a topic where the two subjects come together. |
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