Table of Contents
Suggestions
for the Treasury, the DOL, ERISA Plan Sponsors, Administrators,
Representatives of Plan Participants and Potential Beneficiaries after
Kennedy v. Plan Administrator of Dupont Savings and Investment Plan
Albert Feuer, Law Offices of Albert Feuer
New Ways to Make People Save: A Social Marketing Approach
Annamaria Lusardi, Dartmouth College - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Punam Keller, Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business
Adam M. Keller, Dartmouth College
Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs
Law and Policy
Orly Lobel, University of San Diego - School of Law, Harvard Law School
On Amir, University of California, San Diego - Rady School of Management
Life Expectancy and Old Age Savings
Mariacristina De Nardi, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - Public Economics
Eric French, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
John Bailey Jones, State University of New York
Retirement Income Security and Well-Being in Canada
Michael Baker, University of Toronto - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Jonathan Gruber, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Kevin Milligan, University of British Columbia - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Is Simple Better? A Conjoint Analysis of the Effects of Tax Complexity on Employee Preferences Concerning Company Pension Plans
Kay Blaufus, Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Department of Business and Economics
Renate Ortlieb, affiliation not provided to SSRN
Measuring the Financial Sophistication of Households
Laurent E. Calvet, HEC School of Management - Department of Finance and Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
John Y. Campbell, Harvard University - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Paolo Sodini, Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Retirement Plan Participation in the United States: Do Public Sector Employees Save More?
Swarn Chatterjee, University of Georgia
Velma Zahirovic-Herbert, University of Georgia
The
'New' Paternalism, Consultation and Consent: Expectations of UK
Participants in Defined Contribution and Self-Directed Retirement
Savings Schemes
Gordon L. Clark, Oxford University Center for the Environment
Janelle Knox-Hayes, University of Oxford
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EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, COMPENSATION & PENSION LAW ABSTRACTS
"Suggestions
for the Treasury, the DOL, ERISA Plan Sponsors, Administrators,
Representatives of Plan Participants and Potential Beneficiaries after
Kennedy v. Plan Administrator of Dupont Savings and Investment Plan" ![Free Download]()
ALBERT FEUER, Law Offices of Albert Feuer
Email: afeuer@aya.yale.edu
In Kennedy v. DuPont Savings and Investment Plan (the "DuPont Plan"),
2009 U.S. LEXIS 869 (January 26, 2009), the Supreme Court appeared to
proclaim a "bright-line rule" that plan documents determine ERISA plan
distributions. However, the Court blurred the bright-line rules
applicable to (1) plan entitlements, (2) the alienation of pension
benefits, (3) qualified domestic relations orders, and (4) plan
distributions. The basis for much of this blurring would vanish if the
U. S. Treasury ("the Treasury") and the U. S. Department of Labor ("the
DOL") resumed their pre-Kennedy approach to many of these issues.
Suggestions to improve post-Kennedy employee benefit practices are set
forth for the Treasury and the DOL, for plan sponsors, for plan
administrators, and for representatives of plan participants and
potential plan beneficiaries.
"New Ways to Make People Save: A Social Marketing Approach" ![Fee Download]()
NBER Working Paper No. w14715
ANNAMARIA LUSARDI, Dartmouth College - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Email: annamaria.lusardi@dartmouth.edu
PUNAM KELLER, Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business
Email: Punam.Keller@Tuck.Dartmouth.edu
ADAM M. KELLER, Dartmouth College
Email: adam.keller@Dartmouth.edu
In this study, we use a social marketing approach to develop
a planning aid to help new employees at a not-for-profit institution
contribute to supplementary pensions. We employed different methods,
such as surveys, focus groups and in-depth interviews, to listen to
employees' needs and difficulties with saving. Moreover, we targeted
specific groups that were less likely to save and contribute to
supplementary pensions, such as women and low-income employees. The
program we developed is not only effective but also inexpensive. While
this program was implemented at a single institution, it is suitable to
be applied to a variety of employers and demographic groups.
"Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs
Law and Policy" ![Free Download]()
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 108, 2009
San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 09-006
ORLY LOBEL, University of San Diego - School of Law, Harvard Law School
Email: lobel@sandiego.edu
ON AMIR, University of California, San Diego - Rady School of Management
Email: oamir@ucsd.edu
Research in the field of behavioral economics indicates that
humans stumble in their decisionmaking in predictable ways that can
often be corrected by a gentle nudge from the appropriate regulatory
authority. Two new books -- Dan Ariely's Predictably Irrational and
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein's Nudge -- recount the findings of
behavioral research on predictable patterns in human decisionmaking and
lay the foundation for regulation through choice architecture that
recognizes these human stumbles. In this Review Essay, we provide a
critical account of remaining gaps in behavioral economics research and
suggest that some types of behavioral insights may be better translated
into law and policy reforms than others. We further argue that Nudge's
concept of libertarian paternalism both understates and exaggerates the
jurisprudential and policy implications of regulatory innovation. While
key insights from the behavioral field may lead to effective regulation
systems with minimal intervention, these systems entail costs, have
distributional effects, solve macro coordination problems, and are
inevitably value driven. Moreover, policy nudges serve merely as a
first stage of sequenced regulation where, inevitably, more coercive
measures are required in later stages. The idea of choice architecture
is then related to the growing body of regulatory studies collectively
termed new governance. We conclude with a call for a more nuanced
account of the range of mechanisms as well as the limits, costs, and
consequences of applying lessons from the field of behavioral economics
to law.
"Life Expectancy and Old Age Savings" ![Fee Download]()
NBER Working Paper No. w14653
MARIACRISTINA DE NARDI, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - Public Economics
Email: mariacristina.denardi@chi.frb.org
ERIC FRENCH, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Email: eric.french@frbchi.org
JOHN BAILEY JONES, State University of New York
Email: jbjones@albany.edu
Rich people, women, and healthy people live longer. We
document that this heterogeneity in life expectancy is large, and we
use an estimated structural model to assess its effect on the elderly's
saving. We find that the differences in life expectancy related to
observable factors such as income, gender, and health have large
effects on savings, and that these factors contribute by similar
amounts. We also show that the risk of outliving one's expected
lifespan has a large effect on the elderly's saving behavior.
"Retirement Income Security and Well-Being in Canada" ![Fee Download]()
NBER Working Paper No. w14667
MICHAEL BAKER, University of Toronto - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Email: baker@chass.utoronto.ca
JONATHAN GRUBER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Email: gruberj@mit.edu
KEVIN MILLIGAN, University of British Columbia - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Email: kevin.milligan@ubc.ca
A large international literature has documented the labor
market distortions associated with social security benefits for
near-retirees. In this paper, we investigate the 'other side' of social
security programs, seeking to document improvements in wellbeing
arising from the provision of public pensions. To the extent households
adjust their savings and employment behavior to account for enhanced
retirement benefits, the positive impact of the benefits may be crowded
out. We proceed by using the large variation across birth cohorts in
income security entitlements in Canada that arise from reforms to the
programs over the past 35 years. This variation allows us to explore
the effects of benefits on elderly well-being while controlling for
other factors that affect well-being over time and by age. We examine
measures of income, consumption, poverty, and happiness. For income, we
find large increases in income corresponding to retirement benefit
increases, suggesting little crowd out. Consumption also shows
increases, although smaller in magnitude than for income. We find
larger retirement benefits diminish income poverty rates, but have no
discernable impact on consumption poverty measures. This could indicate
smoothing of consumption through savings or other mechanisms. Finally,
our limited happiness measures show no definitive effect.
"Is
Simple Better? A Conjoint Analysis of the Effects of Tax Complexity on
Employee Preferences Concerning Company Pension Plans" ![Free Download]()
Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 61, pp. 60-83, January 2009
KAY BLAUFUS, Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Department of Business and Economics
Email: kblaufus@wiwiss.fu-berlin.de
RENATE ORTLIEB, affiliation not provided to SSRN
Email: renate.ortlieb@fu-berlin.de
We theoretically and empirically analyze the influence of tax
complexity on the employee's decision concerning company pension plans.
Our model also considers employer signaling and information
intermediation by various actors. The main result of our empirical
analysis is that if tax complexity is high, then only a small
proportion of the study participants bases their decision on their
after-tax return. This proportion increases significantly if tax
complexity is low. However, even in a simple tax system, many people do
not base their decisions on after-tax returns, but instead follow the
advice of an independent product rating agency or a works council
representative.
"Measuring the Financial Sophistication of Households" ![Fee Download]()
NBER Working Paper No. w14699
LAURENT E. CALVET, HEC School of Management - Department of Finance and Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Email: calvet@hec.fr
JOHN Y. CAMPBELL, Harvard University - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Email: john_campbell@harvard.edu
PAOLO SODINI, Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Email: Paolo.Sodini@hhs.se
This paper constructs an index of financial sophistication
that, in comprehensive data on Swedish households, best explains a set
of three investment mistakes: underdiversification, risky share
inertia, and the tendency to sell winning stocks and hold losing stocks
(the disposition effect). The index of financial sophistication
increases strongly with financial wealth and household size, and to a
lesser extent with education and proxies for financial experience. The
index is strongly positively correlated with the share of risky assets
held by a household.
"Retirement Plan Participation in the United States: Do Public Sector Employees Save More?"
European Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2009
SWARN CHATTERJEE, University of Georgia
Email: swarn@uga.edu
VELMA ZAHIROVIC-HERBERT, University of Georgia
Email: vherbert@uga.edu
This study examines retirement plan participation and
savings behavior for American public and private sector employees using
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data set. This paper also
examines the determinants of preference for a diversified portfolio
within the retirement plans. The findings of this study indicate that
the population's plan participation increases with age, income, and
education level. The public sector employees are more likely than
others to participate in defined benefits plans. Conversely, they are
less likely to participate in the defined contribution plans. Also, the
public sector employees who participate in defined contribution plans
hold lower amounts within their retirement accounts. The public sector
employees are more likely to diversify their retirement portfolios or
allocate them in bonds or annuities and are less likely to hold all or
most of their wealth in stocks. Preference for diversification also
increases with age, income and educational attainment.
"The
'New' Paternalism, Consultation and Consent: Expectations of UK
Participants in Defined Contribution and Self-Directed Retirement
Savings Schemes" ![Free Download]()
GORDON L. CLARK, Oxford University Center for the Environment
Email: gordon.clark@ouce.ox.ac.uk
JANELLE KNOX-HAYES, University of Oxford
Email: janelle.knox@ouce.ox.ac.uk
Concern about the competence of individual decision-makers has prompted
governments and pension plan sponsors to take advantage of the insights
gleaned from the behavioural revolution. Auto-enrolment, target-date
and related investment strategies may effectively counter behavioural
biases such as inertia and the lack of attention paid to financial
planning. Nonetheless, some participants may expect consultation when
plan sponsors and management implement 'default' strategies and the
like. Here, we assess the expectations of plan participants drawn from
a national representative sample of UK residents who participate in
defined contribution and personal pension schemes. It is found that
respondents who expressed an interest in a high degree of consultation
over the pathway to retirement were older, have higher incomes, and
recognised the significance of retirement saving schemes for their long
term welfare. A significant number of respondents would not or could
not offer an opinion on the desirability of consultation. These
respondents can be characterised as either discouraged or disenchanted
or disaffected-socio-economic variables were not good predictors of
these respondents' opinions and attitudes to consultation. Our results
support, in part, the 'new' paternalism but raise questions about the
blanket application of related measures to heterogeneous groups of plan
participants.
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